 Hasbrouck's (1991a Hasbrouck's ( , 1991b Hasbrouck's (1991a Hasbrouck's ( , 1991b 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C02, C10, C32, C60, D80, D82 Hasbrouck's (1991a Hasbrouck's ( , 1991b Hasbrouck's (1991a Hasbrouck's ( , 1991b ) model recognizes algorithmic trading as an unexpected trade, i.e. as a trade caused by superior information.
ABSTRACT: The rapid development of electronic trading has significantly changed stock exchange markets. Electronic systems providing trading processes have defined a new stock market environment. Such a new environment requires trading process redefinition (generally defined as algorithmic trading), as well as redefinition of well known microstructure hypotheses. This paper conducts standard

INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of electronic trading in recent years has significantly improved the process of transferring securities from one market participant to another. Electronic trading enables a large number of participants to interact in the market, decreases transaction costs, improves the speed of trade execution, and also requires participants' fast reaction to any new information. Such powerful technological improvements have led to more sophisticated tradingalgorithmic trading. Algorithmic trading usually refers to the use of computer algorithms to break up a large order into a sequence of smaller orders, and the engagement of automated trading strategies for their execution with respect to numerous user-defined parameters, such as time horizon, liquidity constraints, depth of market, volatility, etc. The overwhelming trend in recent years has been to create unique trading algorithms that need to be tested and applied in the market as quickly as possible, due to fast market changes.
Such a new financial environment requires the reinvestigation of market microstructure hypotheses. The market microstructure concept has been defined in various ways, by focusing on diverse aspects of it. It follows the definition given by O'Hara (1995) , "market microstructure is a study of the process and outcomes of exchanging assets under a specific set of rules. Microstructure theory focuses on how specific trading mechanisms affect the price formation process." The main objective in this paper is the information aspect of market microstructure.
Market microstructure hypotheses are typically empirically tested by vector autoregressive (VAR) models (Hasbrouck (2007) , Kunst (2007) , Lütkepohl (1993) ). In the empirical market microstructure literature two approaches are predominant when studying the impact of trades on price formation. The first one is the approach for investigating the effects of trade informativeness on price formation, based on the vector autoregression of return and trade equation. The second one is the extension of Hasbrouck's (1991a) model by incorporating the waiting time (duration) between successive transactions given by Engle et al. (2000) . This model was used to empirically test the role of duration in the process of price formation in the sample of stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The time between trades is modelled by the autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model (Engle (1998) ). To model duration, volume, and returns simultaneously, Manganelli (2005) introduced the model which provides a link between Hasbrouck (1991a) and Engle et al. (2000) , by incorporating the trade sign into the specification of mean of return and adding an extra equation for the trade sign. The model is tested on the sample of NYSE stocks.
The theoretical background of the approaches of Hasbrouck (1991a Hasbrouck ( , 1991b , Engle et al. (2000) , and Manganelli (2005) to the effects of trades to price formation is the theory of the asymmetrically informed market, which basically criticizes the efficient market hypothesis. The efficient market hypothesis assumes that a market is anonymous and all the participants in the market are equally informed about the traded instrument. Therefore, no participant can make economic profit by trading such information, and information contained in trades is immediately reflected in stock prices. However, these assumptions would hardly hold in practice. In reality, all information is not available to all participants at the same time; hence some market participants have a definite advantage over the others. Moreover, although information is public, there is still a difference in the speed of processing them by various participants, which produces a lag effect between the news announcement and trade realization.
Traders may be classified into informed traders -traders with superior information -and uninformed or liquidity traders -traders with public information only. Informed traders may possess information on the true value of securities, fundamentals, or quantities. They tend to trade the specific stock on which they have private information. Liquidity traders trade to decrease costs or to adjust the risk return profiles of their portfolios. They buy stocks if they have excess cash or become more risk tolerant, and they sell stocks if they need cash or become less risk tolerant. The presence of informed and uninformed traders causes an asymmetric distribution of information among market participants. Bagheot (1971) was the first to consider a market with heterogeneously informed traders. This problem was then analyzed by Copeland et al. (1983) and formulated and developed by Kyle (1985) , Glosten et LIQUIDITY ON LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE al. (1985) , Easely et al. (1987) , Admati et al. (1988), and Foster et al. (1990) , among others. Hasbrouck (1991a Hasbrouck ( , 1991b analyzed the influence of an asymmetric distribution of information among market participants on future price formation. In a market with asymmetrically informed participants the market environment is measured by bid-ask spread and the trade is described by its direction -positive if the trade is buyer-initiated and negative if the trade is seller-initiated. The concept of an asymmetrically informed market implies that market makers possessing only public information interact with other market participants who have superior private information. The informed and uninformed traders are undistinguishable to market makers. Hence they compensate for the loss that appears from trading with informed traders by fixing a spread. The main idea of the model is that the trade conveys information and that market makers post bid and ask prices after the realized transaction and with respect to that information. The model is represented by the vector autoregression system of the return and trade equation based on both price and order flow history. Taking into consideration such a system the effect of public and private information on price formation is analyzed, and the transitory and permanent price impact is identified. Hasbrouck's (1991a Hasbrouck's ( , 1991b empirical findings from the sample of NYSE stocks indicate that the effect of permanent price impact is not instantaneous and that it takes several transactions before it is fully realized. By using the impulse response technique (Hasbrouck (2007) , Kunst (2007) , Lütkepohl(1993) , Hasbrouck constructed the permanent price impact as a cumulative response of return to a shock in the innovation of trade equation, where private information must arise if such exists. Also, by the variance decomposition technique (Hasbrouck (2007) , Kunst (2007 ), Lütkepohl(1993 ) he calculated the contribution of private information, i.e. unexpected trade to variation in efficient price.
Information asymmetry influences the bid-ask spread in the market and hence the liquidity. Before the information is publicly available the spread tends to be wider, producing a lot of market volatility. The informed traders, knowing that the spread will narrow once the information becomes public, tend to take the liquidity from the market by executing trades at the available price.
The described concept of the asymmetrically informed market basically coincides with the classical market, or the so-called quote-driven market. In such a market, market makers have an obligation to continuously quote twoway prices at which they are prepared to buy and sell a security. In this way they fill gaps arising from imperfect synchronization between the arrival of buyers and sellers. They are the counterpart in all transactions at the quoted prices: the bid price, at which they are willing to buy securities, and the ask price, at which they are willing to sell. They are the only providers of liquidity in the quotedriven market.
The development of electronic trading technology in recent years has led to a rapid spread of so-called order-driven trading. In an order-driven market there are no designated market makers. Any trader can choose to execute trade via a limit 1 or a market 2 order. They input buy and sell orders for a security into a central computer system where they are automatically executed whenever they can be matched in terms of price and amount.
In this paper we were interested in the informational aspect of price formation across diverse liquidity levelled stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which is predominately an order-driven market. We chose the sample of 18 LSE stocks with different liquidity levels from the FTSE 100 index -the share index of the 100 largest publicly quoted UK companies. The trading process of FTSE 100 stocks is provided by the stock electronic order driven system, called the Stock Exchange Trading System, or SETS. The SETS is an order-matching system based on the concept of priority trading, where orders are ranked in priority of price, then in time within the price. The order book is conveyed publicly in real time. As a result the market benefits from pre-trade transparency, which means that participants have access to the whole order book, and post-trade transparency, which means that participants can immediately observe the last trades recorded by the system. On the other hand, orders and trades are mostly anonymous. Regarding liquidity and price settings, the order-driven market is significantly different from the classical quote-driven 1 A limit bid or ask stock price at which the transaction has to be executed.
2
A buy or sell order of a certain number of stocks at the current standing (bid or ask) price.
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market. Limit orders allow a trader to set a limit price at which the order can be filled, but there is a risk the order will not be executed. Therefore liquidity and price (bid, ask) settings in an order-driven market rely only on limit orders. Interaction between market participants in the electronic stock-driven system environment becomes much more complex, requiring the development of dynamic trading strategies or algorithms that consider everything that can affect price formation. At the London Stock Exchange there is a significant proportion of algorithmic trading. According to the International Banking Systems Journal (June 2007), in 2006 over 40% of all orders were entered by algorithmic traders, with 60% predicted for 2007. Algorithmic trading influence on market microstructure has recently been investigated by Hasbrouck et al. (2007) , Bloomfield et al. (2005) , and Payne (2003) , among others.
In the chosen sample we considered different liquidity dimensions according to several liquidity measures -volume, trade size in pounds, duration, and flow ratio. Following Hasbrouck (1991a , 1991b )} and Payne (2003 , the total permanent price impact and contribution of unexpected trade in volatility of the efficient price are calculated for all 18 stocks. To enable the comparison of estimated permanent price impact across different stocks, a slight modification of the return variable in Hasbrouck's (1991a) model is applied. Applying the Spearman rank correlation test, the obtained results are compared with results on liquidity across different stocks.
Results obtained from the considered sample of 18 LSE stocks suggest that the contribution of unexpected trade in the volatility of the efficient price is larger for intensively traded stocks, where trade intensity is measured by duration and flow ratio. Also, we did not find any significant correlation between these liquidity measures and permanent price impact. We suggest that such results can be explained by algorithmic trading. It is expected that the proportion of algorithmic trading is larger for intensively traded stocks. Therefore in this paper we suggest that algorithmic trading behaves as an unexpected trade in Hasbrouck's model (1991a Hasbrouck's model ( , 1991b .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Hasbrouck's model of permanent price impact and contribution of unexpected trade in efficient price volatility. Section 3 describes the data we used in our analysis as well as the cleaning procedure. Section 4 describes variables for liquidity and Hasbrouck's analysis. The estimation procedure is also described. The results are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
THE MODEL
We followed Hasbrouck's (1991a) 
Theoretically, this model can be of infinite order, but for practical purposes it is truncated at some lag.  are uncorrelated with regressors. Also, it is assumed that they have zero mean, i.e. that .
In addition, it is assumed that they are jointly and serially uncorrelated
The described VAR model is not entirely standard since it assumes that a market maker has information on all lagged returns and lagged trades, as well as information on contemporaneous trades available at time t. That means that return r t contains all publicly available information at time t, and that market makers act primarily on this information set. This model permits Granger's causality (1963) running from trade to return both contemporaneously and with lags. The model also permits Granger's causality running from the lagged returns to trades, but it does not permit contemporaneous causality running from returns to trades. The presence of contemporaneous trade x t , and the assumption of predetermined regressors implies that errors are contemporaneously orthogonal, i.e.  , the least squares estimation of the described VAR model is consistent and efficient.
Hasbrouck formally defined the informational impact of the trade as the ultimate impact on the stock price resulting from an unexpected component of the trade, i.e. the persistent price impact of the trade innovation. This impact will probably not be instantaneous, but rather occurs over a long period of time and will be permanently impounded in the stock prices. Hasbrouck (1991a) obtained the permanent price impact by calculating the impulse responses from the moving average representation as in Hasbrouck (2007) , Kunst (2007) , Lütkepohl (1993) of the system (1), (2).
Under a weak stationarity assumption of time series system (1), (2), by Wold's (1938) theorem the VAR is invertible and it has the vector moving average representation of an infinite order given by
The impulse response coefficients , Hasbrouck's (1991a) estimates for a sample of NYSE stocks suggest that the price impact takes many periods before it is fully realized, and that the price impact function is concave with positive horizontal asymptote. The asymptote of price impact function represents the total price impact of the trade.
To measure a proportion of the unexpected trade in the future price formation, Hasbrouck (1991b) the disturbance term that incorporates inventory control, price discreteness, and other market imperfections that drive the midquote away from the efficient price. Since the random walk decomposition is unobservable, Hasbrouck(1991a) proved that the variance decomposition coefficient 2  R -the part of variance in the efficient price attributable to the trade innovation -can be calculated from the trade/return VMA representation (3), (4)
The final result needs to be understood as follows. Public information events are incorporated into return via the innovation t implied by public information is given by the first term in the numerator of equation (5). The variation in efficient price implied by private information is the second term in the numerator of equation (5). The variation in efficient price caused by both public and private information is then a sum of variations in the efficient price caused by public and private information separately.
DATA AND CLEANING
Over a period of 62 days, from March 1, 2006 to May 31, 2006, the trading attributes of interest for our analysis were observed trade-by-trade for a group of 18 LSE stocks listed on the FTSE 100 index. The 62-day trading sample is long enough to allow reasonably precise estimations (Easley et al. (1993 (Easley et al. ( , 1996 , Engle et al. (2000) ). The trading attributes of interest for our analysis were time, price and volume of the executed trade, and pre-trade bid and ask prices with their related volumes. All data that occur outside the normal trading hours, i.e. before 8:00 a.m. and after 4:30 p.m., were deleted from the sample. We matched the executed trades with their related pre-trade bid and ask prices and bid and ask sizes. After that we excluded all rows in the order book for which column "is a trade" 3 was zero. We then eliminated all anomalous data obviously caused by human and system errors, such as negative spreads, zero bid prices, and spreads larger than 10% of actual stock prices. Since there might be several transactions reported at the same time executed at different price levels, we applied an aggregation procedure which was consistent with liquidity analysis and Hasbrouck's VAR model. The trades that occurred at the same time with the same price and in the same direction were treated as one trade. The volume of such trade was then simply a sum of the volume corresponding to individual trades. After this aggregation procedure the number of observations for each stock decreased on average more than two times. The information about the number of transactions after the aggregation procedure and average midquote for each stock are given in Table 1 . The column "is a trade" in an order book takes value 1 if the trade was executed, and 0 if the trade was not executed.
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VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION
For the purpose of our analysis we considered the following four liquidity measures at the trade execution time t. Compared to the known definition of these measures in the literature, some of them are slightly modified so they can be calculated trade-by-trade as well as compared across different stocks. 
4.
Flow ratio between two successive trades 
To see the real effect of the price impact of the trade on price formation it is natural to observe its pressure on the spread. By slight modification of return variable Following Hasbrouck (1991a Hasbrouck ( , 1991b and Engle et al. (2000) , we assumed that the model given by equations (1), (2) can be truncated at five lags, i.e. The trade variable is a limited dependent variable and it is quite unusual to have such a variable in vector autoregression. The limited dependent variable presents no econometric difficulties when it is an explanatory variable, which is the case for the return equation, but in the case of the trade equation the linear specification is potentially inappropriate. The least squares estimation yields to LIQUIDITY ON LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE an inefficient estimation of the trade coefficients and the standard errors are biased. Following Engle et al. (2000) we avoided this problem by correcting the standard errors after using White's heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator (White (1980) ) to correct the Wald and t-statistics.
For each day of the sample of 62 observation days we calculated the return vector given by (7) and the trade vector given by the Lee and Ready rule (6). The return and trade prior to the first observation of each day was set to zero. Adding the return vector of day i+1 at the end of the return vector of day i, i=1,..., 61, we obtained the 1  n return vector r, where n is the size of the 62 days' sample. In the same way, the 1  n trade vector To obtain the least squares coefficients of the trade equation, we regressed vector 0 t x on the matrix
All calculations were performed using Matlab software.
RESULTS
The average liquidity measures are provided in Table 2 . The estimated least squares coefficients for the return and trade equation, together with the corresponding t-statistics for all 18 stocks, is given in Table 3 and Table 4 . The tstatistics in the trade equation are corrected by using White's heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator. x . It measures an average rise of return with respect to average proportional spread immediately after the buy order. The coefficients b i , i=1, 2, ..., 5 in the return equation for all 18 stocks tend to be positive, meaning that the buys tend to increase and sells tend to decrease the return. According to the Wald test, the null hypothesis that the coefficients b i , i=1, 2, ..., 5 are jointly equal to zero is rejected. The sum of them is positive, and according to the Wald test, significantly different from zero at the 1% level, indicating that the order flow has a positive influence on the return. Positive autocorrelation in trades is visible in positive coefficients on the lagged trade variable, indicating that a purchase tends to follow a purchase, and a sell tends to follow a sell. These coefficients are significantly different from zero, even at the 1% level. Negative autocorrelations in returns are visible in negative coefficients on lagged return variables in the trade equation, which is predominant for stocks with the symbols ABF, CPI, KAZ, SHP, SLOU, and VOD. For other stocks this behaviour is weaker. The Wald test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of return variables in the trade equation are jointly zero is rejected at the 1% level, indicating Granger's causality running from returns to trades. We calculated the return/trade moving-average representation (3), (4) (5) is calculated. These results are provided in Table 6 . For this test all measures are ranked as in Table 7 , i.e. from the highest to the lowest liquidity.
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This means that, for example, stocks are ranked from the lowest to the highest duration and from the highest to the lowest trade volume. Therefore, stocks are ranked from the lowest to the highest total price impact. We ranked stocks from the highest to the lowest variance decomposition coefficient. From all calculated correlations we are most interested in correlations between total price impact PI and considered liquidity measures, and between the variance decomposition coefficient 2  R and considered liquidity measures. we use the Spearman rank correlation test, whose results, with related P-values in brackets, are provided in Table 6 . Correlations between total price impact and volume (trade size in pounds) are positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that higher liquidity measured by these measures means lower total price impact. The duration is positively but not significantly correlated with total price impact. The flow ratio is positively correlated to total price impact at the 10% level. On the other hand, correlations between the variance decomposition coefficient 2  R and diverse liquidity measures are mostly insignificant. The duration and the flow ratios are the only two measures that are significantly correlated to 2  R at the 5% level. These correlations are positive, implying that intensively traded stocks present a larger contribution of unexpected trade in the variation of efficient price. Also, the trade size in pounds is positively correlated to the variance decomposition coefficient at the 10% level. It is interesting that there is no significant correlation between total price impact and variance decomposition coefficient. Figure 1 shows the variance decomposition coefficient versus total price impact across the 18 analyzed stocks. Certain kind of stock clustering can be noticed. The most isolated stocks are the three most illiquid stocks according to Table 7 Table 3 and Table 4 that the stocks with higher predictability of the return equation compared to predictability of the trade equation have higher 2  R . The predictability of the return equation strongly depends on the return volatility. The proportion of positive returns, zero returns, and negative returns for each of the 18 analyzed stocks are given in Table 9. LIQUIDITY ON LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE and the proportion of zero returns is -0.7211 with the P-value of 0.0007, indicating significance at the 1% level. Vodafone has an extremely large proportion of zero returns, considering all 18 stocks. This can explain the low predictability of its return equation compared to the predictability of the trade equation, and its specific behaviour is shown in Figure 1 . Hasbrouck (1991b) R . According to the Spearman rank correlation test, it seems that for intensively traded stocks (stocks with lower duration), and stocks with ability to absorb large trades in a short time interval (stocks with higher flow ratio), the coefficient 2  R is highly overestimated.
CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the empirical test of Hasbrouck's (1991a Hasbrouck's ( , 1991b ) VAR -VMA model on diverse liquidity levelled stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange from the FTSE 100 index. The results on coefficients of return/trade equations (8) and (9) are consistent with Hasbrouck (1991a) . The total price impact in this model is calculated as a response of the return scaled by the average proportional spread to the trade innovation. Our results suggest that for more liquid stocks, where liquidity is measured by volume per trade and trade size in pounds, this impact is lower. However, according to the Spearman rank correlation test, duration is positively but not significantly correlated to total price impact. The flow ratio is positively correlated to total price impact at the 10% level.
Considering the contribution of unexpected trade in the variation of the efficient price, our results suggest that for intensively traded stocks (small duration) and stocks with ability to absorb large trades in a short time interval LIQUIDITY ON LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE (large flow ratio), this contribution is higher. We have found that duration and flow ratios are positively and significantly correlated to the contribution of unexpected trade in variation of the efficient price at the 5% level. The contribution of unexpected trade in variation of the efficient price is positively correlated to trade size in pounds at the 10% level.
Hasbrouck's model assumes a rather simplified trading mechanism between market participants. It assumes the presence of market makers who post bid and ask quotes after the realized transaction at time t and according to information contained in the recent order flow. Every trade this model cannot predict is taken as an unexpected trading activity caused by the presence of traders with private information. In an order-driven market interaction between market participants this is rather complicated. First, there are no classical market makers. Transactions are realized by complementing the price and the amount of various orders placed in the central computer system by diverse participants. A large number of transactions can be realized in a short time interval, or even more in the same time period. Trading on such a market becomes complex and multidimensional, requiring the development of dynamic trading strategies, i.e. the implementation of diverse algorithms. As discussed in Parlour and Seppi (2008) , "when choosing limit prices and quantities for (potentially multiple) limit orders and choosing quantities for market orders, a trader needs to condition on everything that can affect the future evolution of the trading process. This potentially includes a complete description of the existing limit order book -namely, all quantities for multiple orders at multiple prices from multiple past investors at multiple points in time -as well as the histories of all past trades and orders. Dynamic trading strategies also involve decisions about how frequently to monitor changing market conditions and when and how to modify or cancel unexecuted limit orders." Following the previous discussion, trades realized by algorithms will behave as an unexpected trade, i.e. as a trade caused by the superior information in Hasbrouck's VAR model. Since for intensively traded stocks significant employment of algorithmic trading is expected, this could explain the obtained results on the contribution of unexpected trade to variation of the efficient price.
Results obtained in this paper suggest that algorithmic trading behaves as informed trading, i.e. trading with superior or private information. Furthermore, there is a weaker indication that algorithmic trading increases the total money value of transactions (trade size in pounds), which is quite consistent with expectations. This research was limited by the relatively small stock sample. A larger set of observations would provide more robust results. However, even based on such a small sample, these results still indicate a significant relationship between liquidity and information asymmetry on the LSE. More sensitive analysis of the liquidity / information asymmetry relationship would consider the proportion of trades realized by different types of order -market or limit. Copeland and Galai (1983) emphasize that limit orders, giving options to other traders to trade at the quoted price, can be picked off by later traders who possess updated public information or private information. Parlour and Seppi (2008) state that the "limit order book should impound forward-looking information about future price volatility, the intensity of future adverse selection, and future order flow". Therefore, "limit orders are not just susceptible to being picked off by informed traders; they are also potentially a vehicle for informed trading themselves."
